

**LORC 第4班 第5回研究会 2004年11月8日  
研究会記録(詳細)**

日付： 11月8日 AM9:30-12:30  
場所： VNG Meeting Room (The Hague, The Netherlands)  
参加者： 斎藤 文彦 (LORC 副センター長、第4班代表、龍谷大学国際文化学部助教授)  
中村 尚司 (LORC 第4班メンバー、龍谷大学経済学部教授)  
的場 信敬 (LORC 博士研究員)  
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (Associate Research Fellow, the Makerere Institute of  
Social Research, Makerere University, Uganda)  
K.N.Harilal (Centre for Development Studies, India)  
Brij Maharaj (Professor, Department of Geography, University of Natal, South Africa)  
司会： 斎藤 文彦  
記録： 金 湛 (LORC 第4班 RA)

研究会の流れ：

1. 斎藤班代表が本研究会の趣旨を説明。
2. 各研究者 15分程度で各国の状況について報告。
3. 報告内容に対して参加者がコメントし、今後の研究協力体制を検討する。

研究会の趣旨：

LORC 第4班はアジア・アフリカから三カ国ずつ選択し(インド、インドネシア、スリランカ、ウガンダ、ルワンダ、南アフリカ) その六つの国の経験を基に比較研究を行う。さらに、最終年度(2007年度)にはこれら六カ国で地域人材育成に関する実験を行う予定である。今回の研究会は、上記六カ国の事情に通じている研究者を招聘し(インドネシア Hasanuddin University の Dr. Deddy Tikson は事情により欠席) 各国の状況をご報告頂くとともに、共同研究開始にあたっての顔合わせをすることを目的として開催された。

内容：

**An overview of the project (Fumihiko Saito).**

LORC is primarily concerned with the issues related to human resources, i.e. in what ways we can support local renewal efforts and can enhance human resources in today's context that is characterized by decentralization (transfer of authority from central to local government) and globalization (which means local governments are directly in touch with global actors). These themes are now topical in Japan but they are also so internationally, and LORC tries to look at the experience of other countries.

The project is divided into four groups, and Group 4 is to look at the experience of the developing countries (specifically India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka from Asia, and Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa from Africa) and conduct a comparative analysis of decentralization; how decentralization is changing the way in which human resources are developed, and in what ways these human resources can contribute to localities. While Group 4 is concerned with how the developing countries, , for example, promote the notion of participation. Such

promotion can be widely shared with Japan and other countries, thus Group 4 is in no way segregated from other groups of the project.

### **Self-Introduction**

Professor Brij Maharaj (Chair of the Department of Geography, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa)

A political geographer, focusing on the history of segregation, politics of local government restructuring, social movements and change, politics of local economic development, and, more recently, migration and xenophobia, geography and human rights, and social exclusion in cities.

Dr. Taka Matoba (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, LORC, Ryukoku University)

Interested in the concept of sustainable development, primarily in locality of the developed countries. Particularly focusing on the idea of citizen participation and how local people can be involved in the local decision making towards sustainability.

Dr. Zhan Jin (Research Assistant, LORC, Ryukoku University)

Specialized in economic development in the rural area of China.

Professor Hisashi Nakamura (Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University)

Widely involved in various activities, and has diverse interests. Teaching experience and various commitments in South Africa and Sri Lanka.

Deeply involved in local community activities in Japan, particularly of minority groups to improve their social opportunity.

Dr. K.N.Harilal (Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, Kerala, India)

Specialized in international political economy, working on international trade and WTO related issues. Interested also in participatory and decentralized planning – the interest developed from involvement in student movements in Kerala.

Dr. Fumihiko Saito (Leader of Group 4 and Deputy Director of LORC, and Associate Professor of Development Studies at the Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University).

Worked for the UNDP for six years and lived in Bangladesh and Uganda. Joined Ryukoku University nine years ago. Specialized in development studies, focusing on the decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Uganda.

Dr. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (Associate Research Fellow, the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere University, Uganda)

Working on local government, focusing on service delivery particularly of primary health care and primary education. Also interested in participation as a subject on its own, which seems very controversial when applied in Ugandan context. Other areas of interests include: poverty, livelihoods, refugees, and transnational migration. Recently also interested in social relationships in a community and the application of the notion of social capital, and have been working in South Africa, Uganda and Rwanda.

FS: What is encouraging is that everyone is interested not only in the reform of local government structure but how those reforms are related to other issues such as rural–urban migration and segregation. That is because while most existing literatures on decentralization only pay attention to structural aspects, what is in fact required is to consider in what ways administrative reforms would be linked to changes in service delivery and responsiveness of

public sector to people's participation – i.e. whether decentralized government in any sense can be said to be better than centralized government in enabling people to participate in the process of decision making, and actually improve their life. Decentralization is not good in itself, as often assumed – the link between structural change and the ways in which people get together and discuss common issues to derive possible solutions must be made clear, and this is what LORC is hoping to achieve.

## **Presentations**

### **1. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi 'Reassessing Popular Participation in Uganda'**

What will be looked at in this presentation is 'instrumental' participation, i.e. whether people actually contact their leaders on any particular issues, to put pressure on the leaders to deliver a certain standard of services.

#### Background

Like most African countries Uganda has had a history of dictatorship – top-down administrative and decision making processes and state collapse. Uganda became independent in 1962, and from 1962 to the mid 1980s, Uganda went through the state of collapse, and people became responsible for delivering their own services. For instance education was managed by PTAs with very little inputs from the government. Health facility also collapsed entirely, and was taken over by private sector.

From the late 1970s Uganda had a liberation war to remove Idi Amin, who was eventually thrown out of the country in 1979. In 1980, an election was held, and Milton Obote (former president overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971) got elected. However, Yoweri Museveni (current president) claimed that the election was unfair and launched guerrilla war which lasted for five years until when he took over the government in 1986.

#### Resistance Council

Museveni has suspended party political activity while introducing a new kind politics called 'no party politics'. What is interesting is that they set up 'Resistance Council' when fighting guerrilla war, and it became the mechanism through which they administer the areas they occupied. Resistance Council played specific roles during the war, including the recruitment of soldiers, taking care of security, and service delivery in those areas.

When Museveni came to power in 1986, Resistance Council became institutionalized, i.e. turned into a mechanism for local administration and local service delivery, and was spread across the country. In the early days of Resistance Council, they had a system where people felt their voices were being heard, because local leaders were now elected popularly by people at grassroots level. This was a novel, exciting idea, and the Councilors got very popular – partly because they were in charge of supplying essential commodities like sugar. Attendance at the Council Meetings was very high and through these Councils decisions are made about local services and security, and messages were transmitted upwards to the national leadership.

However, the developmental role of these Councils in the early days was limited by the lack of resources and capacity. It became increasingly clear to the government that these Councils could not operate effectively in the absence of resources. At the same time, they came to face what is known as 'participation fatigue'. Services and goods became more readily available in market and the role of the Councils in providing services and goods was reduced, and this led to

the lower attendance at the Council Meetings.

### Decentralization since 1993

Because the government was committed to decentralizing power, they looked for a way of making this a permanent feature of local government in Uganda, and this coincided with the aspiration of international donor communities. Consequently the government got a lot of money from international community, and in 1993 Uganda launched one of the most far reaching decentralization programs in Africa.

Decentralization of power was accompanied by decentralization of responsibility for service delivery as well as of resources (though took very gradual process).

In all of these there has always been an emphasis on the centrality of ordinary citizens in decision making, through a five tiers local government system consisting of: 1) village; 2) parish; 3) sub-county; 4) county; and 5) district. Decisions are supposed to originate from the village and go upwards through these levels up to the national level.

There have been various achievements since decentralization was launched in 1993, such as major improvement of local services through collective actions, construction of schools, clinics and water resources. People have contributed labor, resources and time for these and their management. However, it has not been without problem, of course. Participation fatigue has been increasingly observed, and people have got less willing to spare their time for meetings. Some people found it baffling why they have to plan and implement their own services at local level while at the same time paying tax, since in old system they paid tax and the government took care of the services.

### Problems and Questions

Participation in a sense could make government less responsible, under the guise of giving ordinary citizens power to make their own decisions.

If one looks at what is going on at the village level where participation is supposed to be happening, the notion of participation is rendered problematic. Village Councilors are supposed to meet regularly to talk about the affairs of the community. But in reality people do not attend the meetings as regularly as they ought to, and this discourages local leaders to convene these local meetings. This means that collective actions are more and more undermined. One of the reasons why these meetings have virtually died down has to do with the way the system was built upon democracy. The system is democratic – people choose their own leaders but this itself undermines the leaders' capacity to sustain popular participation. That is to say, since the leaders are elected by people, they are vulnerable against people and cannot compel them to attend the meeting, for example.

The question is: does democracy in some contexts undermine participation? If it does not, does it promote it? If it does, how can participation be promoted and sustained over a long period of time in the context of poverty, illiteracy and other factors associated with local or civic incompetence?

A preliminary research conducted for the project promoting civic participation (commissioned by Municipal Development Program in 2000) indicated that there was virtually no participation in the affairs of municipality by ordinary citizens. There were number of factors which made participation very difficult, such as:

- 1) Lack of knowledge of what local government does or is supposed to do under legislature.

Interviews proved that very few people knew exactly what the law required local governments to do even in terms of service delivery. If people do not know what local governments are supposed to do, how are they supposed to put them under pressure, to do exactly what they are supposed to do?

2) Ordinary people actually feared going to local government offices.

Some of these are located in large, imposing buildings with security guards who are very intimidating to the members of public. Many could not see themselves having a problem going to these buildings, passing through security and going to question their leader about why, for instance, rubbish was not being collected at regular basis.

3) Logistical difficulty.

People live far from local council offices and they cannot spend money to travel to these offices all the time there is a problem.

4) People believed that it is not their business to interfere in the affairs of local government.

It is the business of local leaders to do what they are elected to do and not the business of ordinary people to go and put pressure on them all the time.

5) Lack of time and having other commitments.

People have school fees and food to look for, jobs to do and when do they find time to constantly go and talk to the leaders about the things they elected them to do in the first place.

Local leaders of course pay lip service to the power of people, that people are taking part in making decisions. This is a rhetoric used by local government offices – people are involved in decision making, people tell us what they are supposed to be doing. Yet, when talked to ordinary people the picture seems rather different – they say no, they do not actually do it. There is a mismatch between what local leaders are telling and what ordinary people are speaking.

These findings were presented to the Municipal Development Programme, and they gave \$10,000 to the project to stimulate people's participation in decision making, out of the funding from the World Bank for promoting civil participation. This \$10,000 was supposed to finance meetings. In order to secure people's and local leaders' attendance to the meeting, such as transportation, refreshment and lunch had to be paid for out of this money. When \$10,000 ran out, therefore, it became extremely difficult to convene any other meetings.

When talking about participation, what does it mean? What does it mean when one is talking about the 'success' of popular participation? There seem to be problems at least in a kind of 'participation' looked at in this presentation, but this might be specific ones in Uganda. Interested in hearing the experiences of other countries.

(See also a recently published paper by Golooba-Mutebi 'Reassessing Participation in Uganda' in *Public Administration and Development*, October, 2004)

### Comments and discussion

FS: Different people use 'participation' in different ways. What is debated nowadays in particular is who the participants are, i.e. it has been increasingly argued that not only the direct beneficiaries that ought to participate but also 'citizens'. Another interesting point was the notion of accountability. There seem to be a question as to whose business it is to ensure accountability, especially under dictatorship.

BM: Probably it is the role of civil society. Another important thing to be noted is that participation is also issue based.

KNH: Participation could solve a lot of problems but in most countries, it is getting extremely difficult to make people participate. Why people are not participating? Kinds of issues to

be discussed do matter for example. In urban and semi-urban areas, people realize that most things affect their life, and get interested in various issues. There also exists various network of people. In local areas, on the other hand, people's activities and interactions are confined to small sphere, so is their interests.

FS: The conception of participation is widely debated in the academic circle, for instance as to whether participants are beneficiaries or citizens. Yet does it make any difference in practice, where people are busy in organizing their own everyday life?

KHN: Beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries are more likely to participate.

FGM: But in long term, even the beneficiaries tend to opt out.

## **2. Brij Maharaj “Democratic Decentralization”? Urban Governance in Post-Apartheid South Africa’**

### Introduction

Since the late 1980s, the need for decentralized government has received a lot of focus, as African states became subject to external (linked to donor agencies), as well as internal, democratic process. Mahwood argues in the second edition of *Local Government in the Third World* that demise of the centralized party state in many parts of Africa has resulted in a growing emphasis on the need of good government at the local level. Local governments now play a major role in promoting three important values which nurture democracy: 1) Liberty (local government is a vehicle for dispersing political power and catering for local variations); 2) participation; and 3) efficiency (the notion that local government ought to be more sensitive to the needs of local community).

The restructuring of local government in South Africa is very important in the context of its emerging democratic transition, especially since this transition has taken place in a way that is unique from any international comparative perspective. What is to be emphasized in particular is that the transformation of local government took place spontaneously with the transformation of the national government.

The purposes of restructuring local government were: 1) to rationalize structures of local government; 2) to change its focus from control to development; 3) to eliminate corruptions associated with apartheid; 4) to reduce the duplication of services at local government level; and 5) to create more user-friendly local authority (people were indeed finding them intimidating – ANC noted in the early 1980s that local government is ‘hand and foot’ of the national government).

Contemporary South African city is reflective of apartheid planning, characterized with racially fragmented and discontinuous land use and settlement system, dysfunctional and inefficient spatial ordering, land use mismatches et cetera. What is required are therefore: 1) a new planning discourse which will address and challenge this order; 2) physical and economic reconstruction of the racially divided city and society; 3) a more transparent and unified system of urban revenue creation; and most importantly 4) the social and psychological incorporation of black South Africans that make up more than 80% of the population yet are alienated in the old order.

This presentation will critically reflect on some of the restructuring and decentralization initiatives from a macro perspective.

### The Demise of ‘Top-Down’ Planning

South African cities had little experience in planning at local level because regional

development policies were centrally controlled, and were intended to implement apartheid. All purposes of decentralization in the old order was politically motivated, and what is there is neither the tradition of local responsibility for development, nor an awareness of how to promote development at local level.

Since 1990 there has been an increasing emphasis on local economic development planning strategies because the need of addressing then extremely high unemployment rate at local level was critical. Central government control over local development planning has been reduced, and localities came to have greater control. Thus there was a shift from dismantling of apartheid structures to actually engaging in post-apartheid reconstruction.

A White Paper called the 'Reconstruction and Development Programme' (RDP) outlines how new democratic government would restructure South African society. It states that 'for the first time in South Africa's history, emerging democratic local authorities must work with community based organizations and NGOs to establish minimum conditions of good governance and to implement effective development project'. The RDP was a key strategy to address the social and economic inequalities of apartheid and facilitate the transition to new society.

When the RDP was being drafted, all civic organizations were invited to give comments. It was bottom-up approach and people's views were taken into account – the RDP was derived through grassroots participation. The RDP had strong basic needs and social justice orientation – it was a people driven process, drawn up by the ANC in consultation with NGOs, civics, and labor movements et cetera. It played an important role in ensuring the transition from separate development to more sustainable development. It was full of good intentions but critics say it is too ambitious and utopian, and does not say how these are actually to be realized.

### Urban Development Strategy

The Urban Development Strategy (UDS), released in October 1995 was influenced by the RDP (since all documents that come out have to be consistent with this broad structure). It was going to be people driven, integrated and sustainable, and implemented mainly through the reallocation of existing resources.

The intentions of the USD were: 1) to integrate the cities and manage urban growth; 2) to invest in urban development; 3) to build habitable and safe environments; 4) to promote urban economic development; 5) to create institutions for service delivery. Among these 5) creation of institutions for service delivery is particularly important. Service delivery was primarily the responsibility of the local government, while the central government was responsible for providing funding in accordance with national reconstruction and development priorities.

The USD emphasizes a strong relationship between public and private sector in the delivery of services, and this was the beginning of the notion of partnership.

### Developmental Local Government

In 1994, the democratic government in South Africa acknowledged that local authorities will have an important role in unleashing the political and creative energies of the people and bringing the government closer to the people. The socio-spatial distortions of the apartheid era had to be addressed through more equitable distribution of resources and redrawing of boundaries.

In an attempt to address these problems, the White Paper on Local Government was released in 1998, and it provides the foundation for what is called 'developmental local government', which is committed to working with citizens, groups and communities to create

sustainable human settlements.

The roles of developmental local government are: 1) executing municipal powers and functions to optimize the potential of social development; 2) ensuring socially and spatially integrated development; 3) promoting democratic values; and 4) empowering the poor and marginalized, and build social capital.

There are three strategies to help municipalities to play a developmental role in locality: 1) integrated development planning and budgeting; 2) performance management; and 3) working together with citizens and partners. Particularly important strategy to help municipalities to become more developmental is integrated development planning (IDP), which was developed in the following procedure:

- 1) assess current economic, social and environmental realities in each municipality;
- 2) consult the community in order to determine needs and priorities;
- 3) conduct an audit of existing resources and capacities;
- 4) develop integrated framework and set goals for the future of community;
- 5) implement project.

Manor makes very important point, arguing that 'local authorities are laden with a huge number of highly complex tasks and they are so complicated that the White Paper is in effect saying that there is little hope of their implementation unless technocrats, or at least bureaucrats remain very substantial powers – so many powers that elected representatives will, on evidence from elsewhere, have too little influence to enable local government to work well'.

Trade unions and community organizations are also skeptical if developmental local government can achieve its goals and the poor people would actually benefit. For example, while the role of the private sector in service delivery is emphasized, private sector is, they argue, more concerned with budget than meeting the needs of poor people.

### Metropolitan Government

There are three types of municipalities in South Africa: 1) mega-cities / metropolitan areas; 2) local councils; and 3) district councils (mainly in rural areas). Nowadays there have been a lot of debates about the type of institutions that will best suite municipal institutions, and is best in South African conditions. 'Metropolitan government' in particular has been widely debated – whether South Africa should go for these mega cities or not.

There are two different perspectives with regard to metropolitan planning. Those who are interested in the growth imperative argue that metropolitan government plays a pivotal role in promoting economic development because it is more effective and efficient in reproducing labor power, as well as promoting production and distribution. It also offers, they would argue, tax exemptions and subsidies to attract investment, and facilitates the establishment of pro-growth partnerships with private sector. Those who favor the equity focus argue that metropolitan government can promote more equitable land use, ensure fairer taxation, improve efficiency, service provision and capacity, and reduce socio-spatial inequalities and foster rational planning.

The South African government has advanced three compelling reasons for supporting metropolitan government, or the 'mega-city': 1) it creates a basis for equitable and socially just metropolitan governance; 2) it promotes strategic land use planning and coordinated public investment; and 3) it is able to develop a city-wide framework for economic and social development and enhance the economic competitiveness and well-being of the city. The government also argues that mega-cities would help to: 1) provide socially inclusive development; 2) promote social justice and equity; 3) promote local democracy; and 4) provide efficient services. On the other hand, some are concerned for example that mega-cities may reduce efficiency and are remote from the communities they serve.

### Capitulation to Neo-Liberalism

In June 1996, there was a significant shift from the RDP to what is called 'GEAR' (Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy). While the RDP was derived from the bottom, GEAR came from the top – it was actually imposed on poor communities. There has been a tension surrounding this, and especially COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) has been totally opposed to GEAR, which is seen as an internal structural adjustment policy. GEAR emphasizes that economic development will be led by the private sector; privatization of state enterprises will be encouraged; the government expenditure (especially social services) will be reduced; exchange control regulations are to be relaxed; and labor market will be more flexible. This is basically a neo-liberal strategy.

This has been viewed as a radical departure from the principles of the RDP. Furthermore, importantly, local authorities will be forced to generate a larger proportion of their own revenues, and there is a strong emphasis on public-private partnerships. This is decentralization of power without decentralization of resources, and it simply means privatization and the promotion of the principle of cost recovery, coupled with inadequate subsidies targeted at the poor.

From a planning perspective, the central government controlling over local government strategies has been reduced, and local governments have greater control over such initiatives. One of the reasons for this was the central state's inability to contribute towards the social support and welfare services which were imperative to address the gross inequalities of apartheid, and a lot of this obligation was then transferred to local authorities. The RDP acknowledged that local governments face critical financial problems and will have to find new financial strategies.

It is crucial to note that the ability of local authorities to generate their own revenue has been very limited. One factor that accounts for this is that a very important strategy to oppose apartheid up to 1990 was the so-called 'rates boycott' or 'rent boycott', i.e. refusal to pay rent and rates in black areas. After 1994 people came to be obliged to pay these, yet were still resistant to pay. The government started what is called the 'Masakhane Campaign' ('masakhane' meaning 'let's work together') in order to tackle this situation yet there is still strong resistance to pay because people say they are getting very little in return.

There have been big debates about privatization. The case for privatization is being strengthened because in many parts of South Africa service providing institutions lack technical and institutional management and financial capacities. An implicit assumption in the privatization is that the market is more efficient than government at providing basic services. However, there are limits to what poor communities can afford without active government intervention. Private companies are more profitable than those in the public sector because of their higher cost recovery rates yet this is often done at the expense of the poorest households not receiving any services. Thus, as Hardoy and Satterthwaite argue, 'improved cost recovery in a privatized service may penalize the poorest households'. Regardless of how strong the case for privatization may be, the capacity of private enterprise to provide services will be constrained by the capability of people to pay, and the poor have suffered most from the restructuring and adjustment strategies.

The privatization of services has far-reaching geographical implications. Under apartheid the access to services had a distinct spatiality. Townships were inadequately serviced if at all, while the racially privileged enjoyed access to services of the first world standard. The provision of services under apartheid was also symbolic of the exclusionary nature of the system, black people were seen as outsiders in the urban system – there was a denial of their humanity and their citizenship. The privatization of basic services is against the aim to build an

inclusive society. At the same time, the provision of a minimum level of service to disadvantaged areas re-emphasizes apartheid boundaries in the geography of service distribution. It is becoming increasingly apparent that privatization of basic services has a particular spatial impact which is accentuated by the impact of apartheid.

### Conclusion

The present city in South Africa is a form of colonial hybrid product. The intention of democratic decentralization was to simultaneously equalize, decentralize and democratize. There was a shift from the RDP to GEAR, and the virtual abandonment of the RDP meant the poor would occupy the lowest rung on South Africa's new, non-racial urban hierarchy.

It is clear that decades of institutionalized segregation will not be eliminated overnight. Segregation has been deeply entrenched in the social fabric, and is reinforced by the socio-economic differences between races. A greater emphasis has to be placed on policies that sustain growth through redistribution. The neo-liberal orientation of GEAR runs a risk of creating class cleavages and reproducing socio-spatial inequalities of the apartheid cities.

One thing to be noted is that in South Africa party politics dominates local government elections. There is a proportional representation system (PR), and constituency systems are running in parallel. The PR system favors political parties, and there have been a lot of manipulations. Of course there are arguments for PR – for example that it ensures more equal representation in terms of gender, yet it reduces the influence of constituencies. Due to this structure there is a tension between political parties and local people. Decision making at local level is driven by political parties *struggling against* community. Furthermore, in the last three years South Africa has had a new legislation called 'floor crossing legislation', which allows politicians (elected in PR system) to join another political party without losing their seats, and this has been deepening the controversy.

Lastly, the role of traditional leaders, who are politically affiliated with Inkatha Freedom Party, is another issue that has been problematic in the process of redrawing boundaries.

### **3. Hisashi Nakamura 'Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction through Popular Participation in Sri Lanka'**

#### Background

Situation in South Asia is in some respects similar to that of Africa covered in the earlier presentations. Within South Asia, too, although there certainly are differences in social and economic context, as far as Kerala is concerned India and Sri Lanka share common tradition and similar socio-economic fabric.

Sri Lanka is a small island located just south of Kerala, India, and the island itself is divided into two main ethnic groups – northern part is populated by Tamil, southern part dominantly by Sinhala Buddhists. For about twenty years they fought war against each other, and ceasefire agreement was concluded in February 2002 through the facilitation of Norwegian Government. Since then the situation has been hanging in between war and peace, and there have been peace talks at Satahip (Thailand), Nakompathom (Thailand), Oslo, Berlin and Hakone (Japan) to facilitate talks between Sri Lankan government and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

The next meeting is planned in Washington yet the US government says that the LTTE is a terrorist organization, and the LTTE boycotts the meeting. The LTTE proposes 'Interim Self-Governing Authority', i.e. the LTTE requires some kind of local autonomy and claims that

without this it cannot start any reconstruction / rehabilitation activities, for if everything is done through international organizations or Sri Lankan government, their voices will not be heard. This controversy is still going on and according to one analysis, the key point in the controversy is as to who controls the money needed for development, and without clarifying this any conclusions in peace talk cannot be arrived.

### Transplanted Economy

The economic structure in Sri Lanka is remote from ordinary people's life, and what may be called 'transplanted economy' is there now. The division of economic activities between the English speaking sector and the vernacular is indeed a chief feature of contemporary Sri Lankan economy, as will be discussed later. The foreign and transplanted economy that is aloof from the domestic socio-cultural base seems to have been the major factors of the conflicts in the north and the south of the island. In the south, those who are rejected from the participation of the economic development started to organize and struggle against this. This means that both in the south and the north, there are bases of armed struggles in order to achieve certain kind of economic power for development.

There are important sectors in which these transplanted economies are found such as:

- 1) Plantation sector – started by British colonial planters with migrant workers from South India, and local people are not consulted at all.
- 2) Free trade zones – mainly for foreign market and not serving for local people, and, even worse, exploits local workforce.
- 3) Colombo harbor expansion – largest and successful development project in Sri Lanka, yet mainly looks at overseas and not is catering for local people
- 4) Mahaveli Development Scheme – the development of the biggest river called Mahaveli funded by the World Bank. The construction contract however was given to foreign construction companies and local people were not able to participate.
- 5) Labor-power export – people go abroad, mainly Middle East oil producing countries to find jobs, and this is isolated from the other part of economic activities.
- 6) Foreign aid projects – catering to a particular kind of economic interest. For example a major concern of Japan (the biggest donor) is big construction activities for Japanese construction companies.
- 7) Tourist industry – invests for instance on five-star hotel construction, and is catering for European, American and Japanese tourists but not for local people.
- 8) Economy of the North and East – is entirely segregated from the rest of Sri Lankan economy.

Sri Lanka has to try to integrate these different isolated sectors of economy into one entity. Yet diversity has to be ensured at the same time – indeed, while international aid agencies like the IMF and the World Bank argue for liberalization, East Asian countries (China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan) in fact did not necessarily follow the path of liberalization or market oriented economic development. There is a need of a comparative analysis between East Asia and South Asia.

### Language and the Formation of Socio-Economic Classes

A focal point in Sri Lankan economic division is English versus Swabhasha (vernacular of Tamil and Sinhala). Strong dependency on the use of English has limited the capacity of non-English speaking youth in rural Sri Lanka. There is resentment among young people – only 3-4% of the entire population in Sri Lanka has some command of English and more than

90% are considered not employable by foreign oriented economic establishments. This led to a formation of socio-economic ranking according to the acquired English ability and this deters the emergence of vernacular entrepreneurship, which is crucial in establishing economic autonomy, which in turn is essential for political autonomy.

### Conclusion

There is a need of circularity and diversity in attempt to find a solution for the integration of the rural population. Language is a key factor in this – for it is not merely a means of communication but an embodiment of social and cultural relations. If this cannot be allowed to a vast majority of population, local participation and decentralization cannot be achieved.

### Comment

FS: In the fourth and the fifth year of the project, LORC is hoping to have some on-the-ground activities in the Sri Lankan government's effort to reinstate local government as well as local economy, if the situation there allows it then. The experiences in the post-apartheid South Africa, the post-Amin (or in fact post-Museveni?) Uganda, social movements in Kerala for example seem very useful for Sri Lankan renewal, and Group 4 hopes to make modest contribution by utilizing these.

### **4. K. N. Harilal 'Reforming Local Governance Structures in India Lessons from the Kerala Experiment'**

This presentation is to introduce the situation in India. After outlining the background of India it will go on to focus mainly on Kerala, for the decentralization program there is one of the most ambitious ones in India. Since it is most ambitious, its weaknesses and failure have to be carefully examined, so that the lesson can be learnt, and the lesson will be useful when considering the situations in other states.

### Before and After Independence

According to nationalist scholars, the origin of representative local governance can be traced back to ancient India. However controversial such a view might be, one can in any case certainly find the origin in the period of the colonial rule, the later part of the nineteenth century. There were moves on the part of the colonial government to establish local government – they established village and district level governments with elected and nominated members. The intention was to establish legitimacy of the colonial government, and they were not interested in promoting democracy at the level of national or provincial government but were keen to promote liberal democracy at the very local level. During the period of the national liberation movement, 'gramaswaraj' (village self rule) was a slogan. Yet the new constitution of the newly independent country did not give much importance to local governments – they only got advisory position.

After a decade, however, the need of strengthening local governments came to be recognized because people lacked response to, and were abstaining from, national building activities, and this led to the calling of the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee in 1957. The Committee facilitated the formation of the first generation local governments, but they are apolitical development agents and there were elected members only at village level, i.e. they

were basically to mobilize people for nation building activities, to 'participate', but the role of people in deciding the types of development activities was very limited.

But after the emergency (1975-77), the Ashok Mehta Committee (1977) was appointed, which anticipated the 73<sup>rd</sup> and the 74<sup>th</sup> amendments of 1993 that established the third generation of local governments, as will be discussed. After Ashok Mehta Committee, some state governments like Bengal and Karnataka established very modern local state governments, and these constitute the second generation local governments. These second generation local governments however were not followed in other states, nor did the central government promote them.

### Constitutional Amendments (73<sup>rd</sup> and 74<sup>th</sup>)

In 1993, the famous constitutional amendments 73<sup>rd</sup> and 74<sup>th</sup> came into force. The amendments made fundamental and detailed changes in the area of local self-governments – the local self-governments were now given constitutional status; elections had to be held every five years in every states; the importance of Grama Sabha (the assembly of voters in a village) was defined; directly elected local representatives were made possible; representations of the SC (Scheduled Castes) and the STs (Scheduled Tribes) communities and women were ensured; the appointments of the state finance commission (which would make decision on the use of financial resources) and the state election commission (which possessed all power in conducting elections) in every state were written down; there was a provision for District Planning Committee (DPC) which gave planning responsibility to the local self-governments.

The amended constitution provided a legal structure for the local self-governments, while leaving a room for the state governments to decide the detail. Since it was left to the will of the state governments, there was a considerable variation in ways of implementing this among the states. To put it in other way, while the constitution does not force the state governments to devolve their power to the local self-governments, it does provide a framework for those states which are willing to give power away to be able to actually do so. Thus some states, like Kerala, are going ahead with decentralization programs but many others are not.

### The Kerala Experiment

In fact, shortly after the constitutional amendments of 1993, Kerala enacted the 1994 Acts for the municipalities. There were some limitations in the 1994 Acts, and they were amended in 1999. The 1999 amended Acts contains the spirit of the 73<sup>rd</sup> and the 74<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendments in terms of various kinds of power given to the local self-governments: the role of Grama Sabha is defined; complete autonomy is given to the state election commission; strong power is given to the state financial commission (their recommendations are almost fully implemented); and local self-governments can use money to make and implement their own development plans.

There, one can see almost ideal structure of decentralization, in terms of legal support, devolution of administrative and fiscal powers et cetera. One major contribution of the Kerala experiment is that it has developed a methodology for planning and development, of how to make a development plan with people's participation. People (Grama Sabhas) meet to find and discuss development problems, setting up a project, and through a long process finally every village / municipality makes its own annual development plan. All local self-governments in Kerala are now making their own development plans – people are in fact participating in large numbers, and local mobilization is taking place. A detailed survey of 72 local self-governments conducted by the Center for Development Studies shows that they are undoubtedly pointing towards various kinds of development gains, particularly in the area of the promotion of services.

There have been considerable development impacts in such areas as education, health, food and infrastructure, and there is an agreement among political parties on this. Also transparency and accountability have increased and corruptions are reduced – now the beneficiaries of a project are determined in a very transparent way. There indeed are so many success stories.

However, paradoxes are also there. There is a clear decline in participation, for example, and persuading people to participate is becoming a major issue. Another issue is that the collection of local taxes is falling. Regarding development, there are also issues to be emphasized. Although services and rural infrastructures are quite well provided, in the areas of industry, agriculture, generating sustainable employment and income earning opportunities, it is a failure. This may account for people's disillusionment with the policy.

This also coincided with the impact of globalization which has caused various economic problems. This means that although decentralization and participation are taking place in a major way, there is a failure to address people's life, because most things that affect people are happening outside local areas. At political level, it is also argued that many social and economic problems, like unemployment, poverty, lack of the development of industry, have roots in national and international policies, thus cannot be solved at local level. This kind of argument is objected to in a major way only in Kerala, where there is a strong movement against the donor oriented participatory process.

### **On the Future Organization/Management of the Research**

FS: When the project started last year, LORC did not identify FGM, BM, and KNH as research members. Yet now, as the network has evolved, it would be nice if three could put their names as full research members of the project. The advantage in doing so is that one is to have full information and access to the events organized by LORC. Yet at the same time one is required to have some responsibilities. One of the commitments may be to contribute to the publication of a book towards the end of the project – a book with an introduction and a conclusion and in between chapters on the cases of each country. There are some Japanese researchers in the Group 4 who have reasonable knowledge of respective countries, and some pairs could possibly be formed between them and those who are here today, according to the countries they are involved, to discuss the issues.

A point to be emphasized and born in mind in the process of the research is to always link the structural aspect of decentralization / participation etc. to the real life of ordinary citizens, i.e. how the structure affects possible changes in ordinary people's life. Some of the themes came up in this morning's discussion, like who the participants are, and in what ways they are participating. Another point is that participation cannot be sustained unless for example economic well beings are ensured, or social justice receives due attention. – These are serious issues in South Africa because the country is still in the period of transition from apartheid to democratic, more harmonious state. In the case of Kerala, social justice is relatively achieved yet there are more structural economic problems. Some of these themes are already presented in a general way, yet more attentions has to be given on some of these issues.,, These probably are the things which deserve attention in the future research.

The project has a certain budget, which ought to be spent effectively. For example, if one wishes to conduct a fieldwork in this broad framework, probably with a Japanese counterpart researcher, that may be an interesting way forward. When the Group gets together, once in 6 or 8 months for example, the progress of these individual country-specific researches could be discussed with each other towards the final publication.

Also in the process of exchanging information and ideas, we could share our experiences with people engaging in more practical works, like those in NGOs and local governments, for what will be considered is not to be self-contained within the academic circle. The session in this morning is the first step, and if the Group 4 is to publish a book for instance several further meetings will be required to discuss the matter seriously – thus we have to commit ourselves to a sequence of preparation and obligation.

HN: The experience in Kerala seems very important for Sri Lanka – the constitution of India, the system of local self-government and decentralization in particular, was brought from India to Sri Lanka. In local organizations people have started to utilize the Indian constitution and amendments. Given this context, this seems a good opportunity to link between these two countries.

KNH: Particularly so because India and Sri Lanka share a lot of other features as well – not only constitutional and legal framework but also such as education, literacy, phases of democratic transition etc. A lot of things can be compared.

HN: True. Legal framework alone cannot assure local self-governance.

BM: One of the commonalities between South Africa and India is that both went for economic opening up and restructuring in the 1990s. That is very interesting because irrespective of the difference in scale, the social consequences were the same. The second point is that the elements of the Indian constitution were, apparently, drawn into the South African constitution. A comparative study of India and South Africa would be very interesting – I would be very happy to be involved in this.

KNH: Kerala is politically active state, and what researchers say and their political positions matter so much and may cause a lot of controversies. It is crucial therefore that if the Group 4 is to jointly publish a book, the place of responsibility for the chapters and the arguments must be made explicit.

BM: That will relate to the type of conceptual framework to be adopted in the book.

FS: Having an attempt to publish a book by eight or ten people means that it is impossible to reach a total agreement in every point – neither is it hoped. What we ought to do jointly at the beginning is to highlight the essential points for further individual researches or examinations.

KNH: In any case, a statement that we may have different political views is hopefully inserted in a part of the book.

FGM: Personally, I feel obliged to improve the standard of academic research in this field in Uganda, and consider this as a good opportunity for this, as well as for personal intellectual development.

FS: The last, but not least, thing to be noted is, clearly, the human resources development aspect of the project. For example in each respective country, universities are probably serving as training institutions for national government officers but not necessarily for local government officials. Since we discuss decentralization and talk about the importance of local leaders, the existing curriculums and the way of thinking to educate younger people may need to be changed. This point will have to be discussed in more detail, and as the research proceeds, ideas will hopefully be exchanged. There is a very important practical implication in this project – LORC is trying to generate the next generation's local leaders, and we ought to consider what it means for us teaching at academic institutions in respective countries.